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THE CO-EVOLUTION OF THE
INTERNET AND CIVIL SOCIETY
IN CHINA
Guobin Yang
Abstract
Civil society and the Internet energize each other in their co-evolutionary development in China. The Internet facilitates civil society activities by offering
new possibilities for citizen participation. Civil society facilitates the development of the Internet by providing the necessary social basis—citizens and citizen groups—for communication and interaction. These arguments are
illustrated with an analysis of the discourse in Qiangguo Luntan [Strengthening
the Nation Forum] and an ethnographic study of Huaxia Zhiqing [Chinese Educated Youth], <www.hxzq.net>.

Does the Internet contribute to China’s democratization
and civil society development? Answers to this question are typically ambivalent. The short history of the Internet and the lack of sufficient empirical
evidence make it hard to spell out an unambiguous case. The ambivalence is
also due to the way in which the research question is posed. Historically,
technology has changed human societies, and it is reasonable to ask what this
new technology does to Chinese society today. Yet, this is only one side of
the coin. Technology is used by members of society; its diffusion and use
depend on social conditions. The conditions of society, in other words, shape
technological development.
This article asks instead: how do the Internet and civil society in China
interact in ways that shape the development of both? It argues that Chinese
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civil society and the Internet energize each other in their co-evolutionary development,1 even as both are constrained by other forces. The Internet facilitates civil society activities by offering new possibilities for citizen participation. Civil society facilitates the development of the Internet by providing
the necessary social basis—citizens and citizen groups—for communication
and interaction. The Internet and civil society have an interdependent relationship, yet current literature tends to ignore this relationship and emphasize
the unidirectional impact of technology on society.
To develop these arguments, I will first discuss the developments of the
Internet and civil society in China and analyze why the Internet matters for
Chinese civil society and vice versa. Next, an analysis of the discourse of the
popular Qiangguo Luntan (Strengthening the Nation Forum) in this part
shows how China’s Internet users perceive the Internet. Finally, I will present an ethnographic case study of Huaxia Zhiqing (Chinese Educated Youth,
at <http://www.hxzq.net>. Initially set up as an online bulletin board in June
1998, Huaxia Zhiqing has evolved into a portal site and online community
that typifies the co-evolution of the Internet and civil society in China. The
conclusion summarizes my arguments and addresses broader implications.

Chinese Civil Society: Incipient
Yet Dynamic
Civil society is here defined broadly as the intermediate public realm between
the state and the private sphere. Citizens and citizen groups participate in
organized or unorganized discursive or non-discursive activities in civil society. This definition includes the public sphere, voluntary organizations, and
social movements as key components of civil society. Although some scholars have argued that there is no necessary and logical link between civil society and democracy, a robust civil society is often taken as a basis for
democratic politics.2 Many scholars have argued that contemporary Chinese
civil society is incipient.3 I suggest that the incipient nature of Chinese civil
society is a favorable condition for the development of the Internet in China.
An incipient civil society has many vulnerabilities, but it is dynamic. It ab1. I borrowed the idea of co-evolution from Jonathan Bach and David Stark, “Link, Search,
Interact: The Co-evolution of NGOs and Interactive Technology.” Working paper of the Social
Science Research Council Program on Information Technology, International Cooperation and
Global Security, <http://ssrc.org/programs/itic/publications/working/LinkSearchInteract.doc>,
accessed February 23, 2002.
2. On the “neutral” nature of civil society, see Gordon White, Jude Howell and Shang
Xiaoyuan, In Search of Civil Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 5–6.
3. See, for example, Timothy Brook and B. Michael Frolic (eds.), Civil Society in China
(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997) and Rebecca R. Moore, “China’s Fledgling Civil Society: A
Force for Democratization?” World Policy Journal 18:1 (Spring 2001), pp. 56–66.
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sorbs new things quickly and is open to innovations. Organizational theory
postulates that organizational inertia increases with age.4 Although civil society does not consist of organizations only, social organizations are a central
component of China’s emerging civil society.5 The relative “young” age of
Chinese civil society may thus mean that it is more responsive to technological change, especially those technologies that may meet its needs.
The incipient and dynamic character of Chinese civil society is evident at
various levels. First, there has been an emerging rights consciousness related
to the notion of citizenship rights. Several authors have documented this new
trend, showing that while bureaucratic and economic power often encroaches
upon citizen rights, more and more people have begun to use the legal system
to defend and protect their rights.6 This does not mean that China has developed a strong rule of law, but it does indicate that the notion of citizenship
has become an increasingly important basis and goal of Chinese civil society
development.
Second, there have been significant changes in China’s public sphere.
Studies of Chinese mass media have consistently revealed a tendency toward
the loosening of political control and the parallel trend of commercialization,
despite cautionary notes about the limits of political decentralization and the
problems of commercialization.7 Furthermore, as some scholars have argued, public spheres are not only to be found in the media in China but also
in a wide range of social spaces. Two recent volumes show that China’s
public sphere also resides in living room conversations, McDonald’s restaurants, greeting cards, telephone hotlines, discos, and the like.8 The consumer
4. Michael Hannan and John Freeman, “Structural Inertia and Organizational Change,” American Sociological Review 49 (June 1984), pp. 149–64.
5. Much of the work on Chinese civil society focuses on social organizations. See White,
Howell and Shang, In Search of Civil Society; Brook and Frolic, Civil Society in China; and
Margaret Pearson, China’s New Business Elites (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
6. One indicator of rising rights consciousness is the increase in the number of lawsuits filed
against violations of property and personal rights. See Minxin Pei, “Rights and Resistance: The
Changing Contexts of the Dissident Movement,” in Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance, eds. Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 20–40. See
also Kevin O’Brien, “Rightful Resistance,” World Politics 49:1 (October 1996), pp. 31–55. Also
see Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Pollution Victims Start to Fight Back in China,” New York Times, May
16, 2000, p. A-1.
7. See Yuezhi Zhao, Media, Market and Democracy in China (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998) and Daniel Lynch, After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics and
“Thought Work” in Reformed China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
8. See Nancy N. Chen, “Urban Spaces and Experience of Qigong,” in Deborah S. Davis,
Richard Kraus, Barry Naughton, and Elizabeth Perry (eds), Urban Spaces in Contemporary
China, pp. 347–61. See also Deborah S. Davis, ed., The Consumer Revolution in Urban China
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), especially David Fraser, “Inventing Oasis: Luxury Housing Advertisements and Reconfiguring Domestic Space in Shanghai,” pp. 25–53; Yun-
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revolution in contemporary China has the unintended consequence of producing new social spaces for public expression and communication.
Third, social organizations also manifest an incipient yet dynamic character in China. Western and Chinese researchers alike have argued that although the state still maintains strong control, social organizations have not
only grown in number but also enjoy more independence than before.9 Even
faced with strong state regulative challenges, social organizations have a lot
of room for maneuver. As Tony Saich shows, they have strategies to bypass
the government’s strict registration policies, such as by registering as a business or as a secondary entity of an existing dormant organization.10 While
social organizations can often negotiate freer space within the system, even
the Chinese government has recently called on China’s social organizations
to fulfill social functions as a “third force.”11
In short, Chinese civil society is incipient yet dynamic. Its various elements are not well-developed, but they are growing and transforming, providing favorable conditions for the diffusion of the Internet in China.

The Development of the Internet in China
Current debate on the development of the Internet in China revolves
around two themes, political control and political impact. Studies of political
control of the Internet take the Internet as a dependent variable to be explained, while studies of political impact take the Internet as an independent
variable. One of the most systematic studies of political control of the Internet in China was produced by Michael S. Chase and James C. Mulvenon.12 Their meticulous analysis of the multifarious ways of state control of
the Internet and the creative uses of the Internet by dissident groups shows
that “the Internet . . . will probably not bring ‘revolutionary’ political change
xiang Yan, “Of Hamburger and Social Space: Consuming McDonald’s in Beijing,” pp. 201–25;
and James Farrer, “Dancing through the Market Transitions: Disco and Dance Hall Sociability in
Shanghai,” pp. 226–49.
9. Scholars have begun to study these social organizations as non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). See Deng Guosheng, “New Environment for Development of NGOs in China,” in 500
NGOs in China, ed. NGO Research Center, Tsinghua University (United Nations Centre for
Regional Development and NGO Research Center, Tsinghua University, 2002), pp. 17–29. See
also Susan H. Whiting, “The Politics of NGO Development in China,” Voluntas 2:2 (1991), pp.
16–48 and Qiusha Ma, “Defining Chinese Nongovernmental Organizations,” Voluntas 13:2
(2002), pp. 113–30.
10. Tony Saich, “Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China,”
China Quarterly 161 (March 2000), pp. 124–41.
11. “Chinese NGOs to Work with Government for Poverty Reduction,” Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], online English edition, Beijing, October 28, 2001, <http://english.peopledaily.com.
cn/200110/28/print20011028_83359.html>.
12. Michael S. Chase and James C. Mulvenon, You’ve Got Dissent! Chinese Dissident Use of
the Internet and Beijing’s Counter-Strategies (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002).
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to China, but instead will be a key pillar of China’s slower, evolutionary path
toward increased pluralization and possibly even nascent democratization.”13
Another important study, by Eric Harwit and Duncan Clark, examines political control at the level of physical network and content.14 They find that
both the private sector and the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) vie for
control of the network infrastructure, not necessarily in order to maintain
control over content, but to collect revenues and profits. Content control is in
the hands of several other government and party organs. Yet, for two reasons, content control remains “schizophrenic”15 and ineffective. First, the
concerns of government agencies responsible for content control may conflict
with the lucrative interests of MII and the private sector, thus making control
difficult. Second, much of China’s Internet content is in private hands and
some comes from foreign sources, which exacerbates the difficulty of control. As a result, political control tends to take the form of “killing the
chicken to scare the monkeys,” i.e., occasionally arresting one or two violators.16 This tactic induces self-censorship among users.
While studies of political control of the Internet show who attempts to
control what and how control is maintained and challenged, studies of the
political impact of the Internet, though few in number, convey several mixed
messages. First, there is some recognition that diffusion of the Internet will
challenge undemocratic state behavior and enhance pluralism.17 Second,
there is evidence that the Internet has important implications for China’s public sphere, associational life, and political activism.18 There are also cautionary notes about the limits of the Internet as a tool for political change.
Kathleen Hartford, for example, suggests that “as Internet use and applications expand in China . . . we may well find that its greatest impact lies in
13. Ibid., p. 90.
14. Eric Harwit and Duncan Clark, “Shaping the Internet in China: Evolution of Political
Control over Network Infrastructure and Content,” Asian Survey 41:3 (May/June 2001), pp.
377–408. See also Zixiang Tan, “Regulating China’s Internet: Convergence toward a Coherent
Regulatory Regime,” Telecommunications Policy 23 (March–April 1999), pp. 261–76; Jack
Linchuan Qiu, “Virtual Censorship in China: Keeping the Gate between the Cyberspaces,” International Journal of Communications Law and Policy 4 (Winter 1999/2000), pp. 1–25; Kathleen
Hartford, “Cyberspace with Chinese Characteristics,” Current History (September 2000), pp.
255–62; Nina Hachigian, “China’s Cyber-Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 80:2 (March/April 2001),
pp. 118–33; and Philip Sohmen, “Taming the Dragon: China’s Efforts to Regulate the Internet,”
Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 1 (Spring 2001), pp. 17–26.
15. Harwit and Clark, Shaping the Internet in China, p. 408.
16. Ibid., p. 395.
17. See Chase and Mulvenon, You’ve Got Dissent! and Geoffry Taubman, “A Not-so World
Wide Web: The Internet, China, and the Challenges to Nondemocratic Rule,” Political Communication 15 (April 1998), pp. 255–72.
18. Guobin Yang, “The Internet and Civil Society in China: A Preliminary Assessment,”
Journal of Contemporary China, forthcoming.
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intensifying existing social contradictions.”19 Some analysts have warned
that the Internet may become a tool for the expansion of Chinese nationalism
of both the popular and official types. Todd Munson’s analysis of a Chinese
tourism website shows how nationalism is “sold” online.20 C. R. Hughes
and Alan R. Kluver have both argued that the Internet may be used to promote nationalism rather than democracy.21
Current focus on the political control and impact of the Internet in China
has opened key areas for research, yet such a focus has unnecessarily limited
the scope of the research questions. Technological diffusion is not shaped
only by political and economic factors, nor is the impact of technology confined to the political sphere and state behavior. Broader realms of social life
may affect technological diffusion while being mediated by technologies.
Social and technological processes may develop along parallel paths with
mutual influences. From this perspective, it is crucial to examine how Chinese civil society shapes the development of the Internet, and vice versa.

Why Does the Internet Matter for
Chinese Civil Society?
One way of understanding the significance of the Internet for Chinese civil
society is to compare Internet use by civil society with two other areas: egovernment and e-commerce. E-government and e-commerce have both
been promoted by the Chinese government, yet they have developed at a rate
far slower than, so to speak, China’s e-civil society.22 Commentators have
observed the slow development of e-commerce in China thus far, even while
being optimistic about its potential size and scope in the future.23 Statistics
19. Kathleen Hartford, “Cyberspace with Chinese Characteristics,” p. 261.
20. Todd Munson, “Selling China: www.cnta.com and Cultural Nationalism,” Journal for
Multimedia History 2:1 (1999), <http://www.albany.edu/jmmh/vol2no1/chinaweb.html>.
21. C. R. Hughes, “Nationalism in Chinese Cyberspace,” Cambridge Review of International
Affairs 13:2 (Spring–Summer 2000), pp. 195–209; Randy Kluver, “New Media and the End of
Nationalism: China and the US in a War of Words,” Mots Pluriels 18 (August 2001), <http://
www.arts.uwa.edu.au/MotsPluriels/MP1801ak.html>.
22. In the literature on Internet use by civil society organizations, there is some recognition
that the Internet attracted civil society organizations before it became attractive to commercial
and political institutions. See, for example, Patti Whaley, “Human Rights NGOs: Our LoveHate Relationship with the Internet,” in Human Rights and the Internet, edited by Steven Hick,
Edward F. Halpin and Eric Hoskins (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 30–40. See also
Roberto Bissio’s essay about the experience of the influential Association for Progressive Communications: Roberto Bissio, “The Network Society, 1990–2000: Electronic Conferences,
Global Summits, Getting Together for Good Purposes,” in The Association for Progressive Communications, APC Annual Report, 2000, pp. 22–26, <http://www.apc.org/english/about/index.shtml>, accessed May 16, 2003.
23. Ernst Dieter and He Jiacheng, “The Future of E-Commerce in China,” Asia Pacific Issues,
no. 46 (October 2000).
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1 Select Network Services Used by Internet Users in China (Multiple Options),
June 1999–December 2002 (in percent)

June 1999
December 1999
June 2000
December 2000
June 2001
December 2001
June 2002
December 2002

Email

Newsgroups

BBS

Online
Shopping

Online
Payment

90.9
71.7
87.7
87.7
74.9
92.2
92.9
92.6

21.4
17.0
25.4
19.3
10.7
13.4
20.4
21.3

28.0
16.3
21.2
16.7
9.0
9.8
18.9
18.9

3.2
7.8
14.1
12.5
8.0
7.8
10.3
11.5

N/A
1.8
3.7
2.7
1.8
2.1
N/A
N/A

SOURCE: China Internet Network Information Center survey reports, July 1999, January 2000,
July 2000, January 2001, July 2001, January 2002, July 2002, January 2003. See <http://
www.cnnic.net.cn>.

published by the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) indicate that although more and more people in China seem to be buying or
making payments online, the percentage has remained very small over the
years, both in absolute and in relative terms. In June 1999, 3.2% of respondents reported having shopped online, while 21.4% reported having used
newsgroups and 28% bulletin boards. The numbers fluctuated, with a curious
increase in online shopping up to 14.1% in June 2000, while the percentages
of respondents who used newsgroups and bulletin boards in June 2000 were
25.4% and 21.2%, respectively. The numbers for all three categories declined after June 2000 and rose again one year later, though significantly
more people reported having used newsgroups and bulletin boards than used
online shopping or online payment. Table 1 shows these numbers from June
1999 to December 2002. Email, which has consistently been the most frequently used network service, is added for comparative purposes.
The general pattern is clearly that China’s users are more attracted to the
social than the commercial functions of the Internet. The drop in reported
user preferences for newsgroups and bulletin boards in 2001 may have been
due to government policies to promote e-commerce and discourage newsgroup and bulletin board activities,24 but even under conditions of tighter
24. The Chinese government announced regulations targeting bulletin boards in November
2000, stipulating that bulletin board services should follow a licensing procedure and that users
could be held responsible for what they say online. This may have adversely affected the use of
newsgroups and bulletin board systems. For a list of Internet regulations in China, see <http://
www.cnnic.net.cn>.
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political control, many more people were engaged in online social and political activities than in commercial activities.
In January 1999, the Chinese government launched a “Government Online” project. Its goal is to increase administrative efficiency, reduce costs,
and give citizens more access to government information. Within about a
year, China’s “gov.cn” domain names had increased from 982 to 2,479. By
December 2002, China had a total of 7,796 gov.cn domain names, accounting
for 4.3% of all .cn domain names.25 Although government websites have
been on the increase, how effective they are as a means of providing information and encouraging public participation remains doubtful. Chinese journalists have complained that government websites are often inactive, outdated,
or lack useful information.26 According to one study, even the website of
Qingdao city in eastern China, one of the top five e-government websites in
China, had only about 1,500 hits a day as of December 2000.27 In contrast,
at roughly the same time, China’s popular bulletin board Qiangguo Luntan
(Strengthening the Nation Forum) had about 100,000 hits and 1,000 posts
daily.28 Even a specialized bulletin board like Huaxia Zhiqing Luntan (Forum for Chinese Educated Youth), which attracts mainly members of China’s
“educated youth,” the “Red Guard” or “sent-down” generation,29 had an average of 700 hits daily. [Editor’s Note: For an extended discussion of zhiqing, see Nora Sausmikat, “Generations, Legitimacy, and Political Ideas in
China: The End of Polarization or the End of Ideology?” Asian Survey 43:2.]
It is quite clear that civil society use of the Internet by far surpasses egovernment and e-commerce at this stage. How to explain such disparities?
Why could civil society sectors take better advantage of the Internet? In the
case of e-government, a major problem lies with the government agencies
that run their websites. There is simply too little information there. The slow
development of e-commerce involves complicated factors, such as the lack of
25. CNNIC, “Zhongguo hulian wangluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baogao” [Statistical report on the conditions of China’s internet development], January 2003, <http://www.cnnic.net.
cn/develst/2003-1/>.
26. “Zhengfu wangzhan heshi huo qilai?” [When will government websites come to life?],
<http://www.gov.cn/news/detail.asp?sort_ID=7391>, accessed April 2, 2003.
27. Junhua Zhang, “China’s ‘Government Online’ and Attempts to Gain Technical Legitimacy,” ASIEN 80 (July 2001), pp. 1–23.
28. The figures are based on data I collected in my online ethnographic research. The
100,000 daily hits are figures for May 2000. The 1,000 daily posts are figures for December
2000.
29. The “educated youth” (or zhiqing) generation is sometimes known as the Red Guard generation or the Cultural Revolution generation. It refers to the cohort that was sent down to the
countryside in the “Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages” movement. The movement
started in 1968 and was officially called off in 1980. See Liu Xiaomeng, Zhongguo zhiqing shi:
Da chao 1966-1980 (A History of the Educated Youth in China: High Tide 1966–1980) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1998).
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an effective legal framework, and security concerns. To understand the relatively high level of Internet use by civil society sectors requires a historical
understanding of the conditions of Chinese civil society and some knowledge
of the technical features of the Internet.
There are many different descriptions of the technical features of the Internet. Jonathan Bach and David Stark capture them well with their emphasis
on the Internet’s capacity to “link, search, interact.”30 They explain that the
telephone can be used to search for people and link them up so that they can
interact, yet this process is only additive. On the Internet, this process becomes multiplicative and recombinatory, with each step—search, link, or interaction—forming the basis for other steps. In explicating the political
implications of this multiplicative, interactive technology, Bach and Stark
suggest that Internet use creates a space for something to happen as well as a
space within which something happens, including new social bonds and new
forms of organization. It is ideal “for lowering transaction costs, increasing
participation and impact, and streamlining operations.”31
Of course, the technical features of the Internet do not automatically promote civil society. The Internet may be used by state or nonstate actors to
undermine the development of civil society.32 Yet, the Internet remains a
relatively powerful new medium and space for participation in civil society.
The term “relatively powerful” is worth emphasizing. Studies of technological diffusion generally hold that the “relative advantage” of new technologies
compared to existing ones is an important facilitating factor in the diffusion
of new technologies.33 New technologies may have relative advantages in
the sense that they better meet certain social needs. In China’s case, the Internet can better meet people’s needs for personal expression and public participation than conventional media can.
A historical perspective may further highlight the contemporary relevance
of the Internet. In Maoist China, political participation was strictly guided by
the state, and political dissent was a risky behavior. In the reform period
beginning in 1978, mass political campaigns gradually receded from China’s
political scene while new, individualist modes of political participation appeared.34 In his study of political participation, Tianjian Shi enumerates 28
30. Bach and Stark, “Link, Search, Interact.”
31. Ibid.
32. See Greg Walton, “China’s Golden Shield: Corporations and the Development of Surveillance Technology in the People’s Republic of China,” International Centre for Human Rights
and Democratic Development, 2001, <http://www.ichrdd.ca/frame.iphtml?langue=0>, accessed
April 12, 2002.
33. Everett Rogers, The Diffusion of Innovations, fourth edn. (New York: Free Press, 1995).
34. Wenfang Tang and William Parish, Chinese Urban Life Under Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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political acts used by citizens in Beijing to articulate interests. With the exception of big-character posters, none of these involves public participation.
Most acts, such as “complaints through the bureaucratic hierarchy,” involve
the airing of personal grievances without the possibility of opening up these
grievances for public discussion.35 A basic conclusion to be drawn from
these studies is that while the channels for citizen participation have expanded in the reform era, they are neither adequate nor sufficiently open to
the broader citizenry. The Internet offers new possibilities.

Why Is an Incipient Civil Society
Favorable for Internet Diffusion?
The Internet began to develop in China in the mid-1990s, at a time when a
civil society was already emerging.36 Ever since, this emerging civil society
has provided favorable conditions for diffusion of the Internet. First, existing
and dormant citizen groups and networks provide a social basis for using the
Internet. The interactive nature of the Internet means that for it to be used
and popularized, a basic level of online social interactions is necessary. Interactions may take place among total strangers, as is common in chatrooms
and bulletin boards. Formal and informal social groups provide networks for
online interactions to occur. Examples include professional groups, alumni
networks, and other social groups based on some kind of preexisting identities. The case study of China’s “educated youth” generation to be presented
below will demonstrate how a generational identity serves as the nexus of
solidarity among a group of Internet users.
Second, the internal dynamics of Chinese civil society also favor the development of the Internet. There are various manifestations of such dynamics,
such as the expansion of individual rights and urban public spaces, the
proliferation of popular protest, the decentralization of the media, and the
expansion of associational life.37 These dynamics derive from the extraordinary combination and juxtaposition of ambiguities, tensions, contradictions,
and hopes in contemporary Chinese life. To take one obvious example: how
can we understand all the social problems (such as accentuated unemployment, prostitution, and corruption) that have accompanied China’s “progress”
35. Tianjian Shi, Political Participation in Beijing (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1997).
36. China was connected to the Internet in 1994, when there were about 10,000 Internet users.
By October 1997, Internet users in China had reached 620,000. See CNNIC, “Zhongguo hulian
wangluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baogao” [Statistical report on the conditions of China’s
internet development], October 1997, <http://www.cnnic.net.cn/develst/cnnic199710.html>.
37. See essays in Davis, Kraus, Naughton, and Perry, eds., Urban Spaces in Contemporary
China; Deborah Davis, ed., The Consumer Revolution in Urban China; and Perry and Selden,
eds., Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance.
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toward modernity? How can we understand modernization in light of these
social ills? And how can we understand the value of one’s personal life if
one happens to be a helpless victim of these problems? These are common
concerns among the Chinese public, often heard and lamented about in daily
conversations. Thus, when the Internet began to spread, users quickly embraced it as a means of expressing and discussing such concerns. Hence the
proliferation and popularity of online magazines and bulletin boards.38 To a
certain extent, the government’s reinforced measures to regulate the Internet
toward the end of 2000 was a response to the widespread online debates
about these social problems.39
Lastly, as noted above, the essence of civil society is citizen participation
in public life. Citizens may or may not perceive the Internet as conducive to
public participation. Such perceptions influence Internet behavior. A comparative study of public attitudes toward computer-mediated communication
in Japan and South Korea shows that although Japan is technologically more
developed, people in South Korea are more enthusiastic about the Internet as
a tool of communication and information exchange. The stronger interest in
Korea seems to derive especially “from the desire for free expression that had
been suppressed during the years of dictatorship that ended in 1987.”40 Is
there a similar desire for free expression in China? Students made a strong
case for this in 1989 with their own actions. Does the passion for free expression still live on today? What is the perception of the Internet as a means
of public participation among China’s Internet users?
To understand these questions, I conducted a discourse analysis of the
posts that appeared from August 1999 to December 2000 in the most popular
online bulletin board in China, Qiangguo Luntan, or QGLT for short. QGLT
is affiliated with Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], the leading official newspaper in China. It practices more censorship than other bulletin boards and is
thus a conservative case for analyzing public perceptions of the Internet in
China.41 Yet even here, the message is clear: Internet users generally con38. Major portal sites such as Sina.com, Sohu.com and Netease.com all support popular bulletin boards. For a study of online intellectual magazines in China, see Yongming Zhou, “Expanding Space under Refined Control: Party-State, Intellectuals, and Cyberspace in
Contemporary China.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, March 28, 2003, New York.
39. The Chinese government promulgated several Internet regulations in November 2000,
including one about bulletin board systems. See <http://www.cnnic.net.cn/>.
40. Robert J. Fouser, “ ‘Culture’, Computer Literacy, and the Media in Creating Public Attitudes toward CMC in Japan and Korea,” in Culture, Technology, Communication: Towards an
Intercultural Global Village, ed. Charles Ess (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York
Press, 2001), p. 271.
41. One of the most popular Chinese-language bulletin boards, QGLT <http://bbs.people.com
.cn/bbs/mlbrd?to=47> boasted 30,000 registered user names in May 2000 with an average of
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sider the Internet as a freer and more open space for public participation.42
(Below, transliterated user names and dates of posting are included in parentheses, in order to give electronic “voice” to individuals expressing their
views in the Forum.) Users speak of the Internet as a place for ordinary
people to discuss national affairs, communicate feelings, and express opinions (Suisheng yousi guoqiren, 11/03/99);43 a place for self-discovery and
self-expression (Guiyuan, 11/07/99); a space for demanding democratic supervision and independent thinking (Changren, 11/15/99); and a “coffee
shop” that “cannot turn away customers, nor dictate what they talk about”
(Zuishang bushuo, xinlixiang!, 04/08/00). They often compare the democratic potentials of the bulletin board (BBS) forum with the lack of such
potentials in conventional media, and are excited about the new possibilities
of freedom of speech. Thus, the author of one post calls QGLT “a sacred
temple where we had our first taste of the sacred rights of freedom of
speech,” and believes that QGLT “provides an opportunity of expression for
grassroots voices that have always been repressed and blocked” (Changren,
01/19/00).
Users are also aware of the potential political functions of the Internet.
One post notes that QGLT is already beginning to function as “a clearing
house for world news, different view points, and people’s voices” (Duoduoshuo [talk-talk-talk], 07/25/00). Some propose that QGLT could serve
China’s democratic governance. One post submits that QGLT could become
an online RAND company (sic) for the Chinese government (Guoke, 09/20/
99). Another suggests that “QGLT should be a place for hearing people’s
voices and providing input for government decision-making” (Beidou, 02/24/
00). Others emphasize democratic participation. Thus, QGLT should become a channel for ordinary citizens to participate in government (Guoke, 10/
07/99). “The forum should become a people’s democratic square” (Xinzuo1,000 posts daily. As of April 2, 2003, the online community of which QGLT is a part, has
196,402 registered users. The discussions in QGLT are mostly about current affairs. The forum
opens on a limited basis, from 10 A.M. to 10 P.M. daily, and has computer filters and full-time
hosts to monitor posts.
42. This finding is supported by the results of an Internet survey, which shows that compared
with newspapers, television and the radio, the Internet is perceived as more conducive to expressing personal views. See Guo Liang and Bu Wei, “Huliangwang shiyong zhuangkuang ji yingxiang de diaocha baogao” [Investigative report on internet use and its impact] (Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences and Center for Social Development, April 2001), <http://www.chinace.org/ce/
itre/>, accessed April 12, 2002.
43. “Suisheng yousi guoqiren” is the transliteration of the user name of the person who posted
the message. Many of these user names are humorous and expressive. “Suisheng yousi
guoqiren” means “a state enterprise employee who, though alive, is like dead.” “11/03/99” refers to the date the post appeared in the forum. I will follow the same citation format throughout
this article. Many of these posts are no longer available online but are part of my personal
collection of downloaded files.
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pai [New-leftist], 01/06/00). The multiple voices in the forum should be published in the pages of official news media (Changren, 11/09/99; Shuini, 03/
28/00). In aggregation, the persistent voice is to call on QGLT to use this
space to promote democratic politics in China (Xingfu, 11/09/99).
The censorship practices in QGLT have incurred repeated criticisms,44 but
by and large users of the forum consider the Internet as a means of and space
for public participation. This perception influences their likelihood to participate in online communication and interaction.

<www.hxzq.net>: A Case Study
To illustrate the co-evolution of the Internet and civil society, I present a case
study of <www.hxzq.net>, based on close contact with its collective management and intensive research into the site.45 Conclusions below derive from
this work. Called Huaxia Zhiqing, or Huazhi for short, hxzq.net is a network
of websites run by about a dozen former educated youth (zhiqing). The development of Huazhi is a story of the development of an Internet enterprise.
Huazhi is also an active virtual community of members of the educated youth
generation, with activities often spilling out to the “real” world, such as mutual visits and social gatherings. Huazhi’s growth exemplifies the growth of
a civil society group. The challenges it encounters as well as its dynamic
growth reflect the challenges and dynamics of an incipient civil society.
Huazhi started out as an online bulletin board set up by two former educated youth on June 18, 1998. By May 2000, it had attracted a daily average
of 700 hits and ranked 15th in the list of top-ranking Chinese-language bulletin boards maintained by <www.geocities.com>. In July 2000, through online discussions, the core members of the forum established a “Chinese
Educated Youth Internet Studio” (Huaxia Zhiqing Wangluo Gongzuoshi), a
collective management entity, to plan, develop, and fund the operations of its
BBS forum and associated websites. As of April 2, 2003, Huazhi functions
as a portal site comprising the following elements:

44. The following message is only one of many examples of such criticisms: “No one should
be domineering and stand above others. People are equal: I hope the administrators and hosts [of
QGLT] give serious thought to this issue. . . . We are fed up with reading stuff with the same
uniform views. We should be able to read reports of the same event from different angles
(Beidou, 05/16/00).
45. All data on Huaxua Zhiqing are collected based on my online participant observation and
ethnographic research. I began to participate in Huazhi’s online activities in February 2000 and
became a member of its collective management body “Huaxia Zhiqing Internet Studio” when it
was set up in July 2000. I explained to members of the Studio that I was not a former educated
youth but was doing research on the educated youth generation. I obtained their permission to
write about Huazhi in my research.
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three online forums;
four websites featuring, respectively, the history of the sent-down movement,
old photos, songs, and music from the educated youth period, and educated
youth literature;
a collection of personal essays written by participants of this virtual community;
a selection of messages posted to the bulletin boards on various issues related to
educated youth;
a database of 237 former educated youth with current contact information;
public debates on issues related to the educated youth generation;
other related historical documents, e.g., the Cultural Revolution;
links to a collection of personal home pages maintained by former educated
youth.

Huazhi is a successful website and active online community. It has raised
enough money to lease commercial server space. It has organized several
large online activities, including a virtual New Year celebration party broadcast live online. Members have also organized offline gatherings in Beijing,
Wuhan, and Guangzhou. The community’s online archives contain valuable
research resources on the past and present of the educated youth generation.46
For all these reasons, Huazhi has not only attracted many former members of
the educated youth generation but has also caught media attention in China.47
Why is the Internet important for these former educated youth? How do
they make the Internet work? From the perspective of civil society, it may be
argued that in contemporary China, members of the educated youth generation form a large and important social group. They have already been engaged in civil society activities even before the Internet entered Chinese life.
Indeed, triggered by an influential museum exhibit in Beijing in November
1990 featuring the history of the sent-down movement, a wave of collective
nostalgia swept over the generation during the subsequent decade. Since
then, members of the generation have organized and participated in voluntary
group activities, such as “homecoming” trips to the villages or farms where
they had spent their youthful years. They have intervened in China’s public
sphere debates by publishing reminiscences of the past and collections of oldtime photos, diaries, letters, and poems.48 Their active participation in Chinese public life reflects a desire to solve an identity crisis at a time of great
46. For example, a Beijing Youth Daily article about a fundraising performance in support of
the victims of a disastrous snowstorm in Inner Mongolia was written based on materials in
Huazhi. See Yuan Xiaolu, “Caoyuan zai nali?” [Where are the grasslands?], Zhongguo Qingnian
Bao (China Youth Daily), March 14, 2001.
47. For example, Huazhi was mentioned as a popular website in an article published in the
Dazhong wangluo bao [Popular Net News] on January 8, 2001.
48. Nostalgic in undertones, these reminiscences often contain critiques of the present. See
Guobin Yang, “China’s Zhiqing Generation: Nostalgia, Identity, and Cultural Resistance in the
1990s,” Modern China 29:3 (July 2003).

GUOBIN YANG

419

social change. There is a sense among many that their generation is being
forgotten as China marches toward modern times, while they had sacrificed
their youth for the country’s modernization projects. They yearn to express
themselves and share their historical experiences.49
Common historical experience and nostalgia, generational identity and a
shared sense of common fate, loosely organized groups, a yearning for selfexpression and social interaction—these are the sociological conditions crucial to the success of Huazhi as an online network of former educated youth.
These conditions influenced the generation’s impulse to go online. When the
Internet began to be popularized in China, it seems that many educated youth
in different parts of the country simultaneously discovered it as a useful new
medium for communication and expression. Many personal home pages featuring themes related to educated youth appeared after 1998;50 Huazhi was
only one of the earlier ones. Former educated youth went online in search of
other former educated youth. One person describes his first encounter with
Huazhi in the following terms:
Once, after some random searching, I entered Huazhi’s website and then Huazhi’s
bulletin board. . . . A new world appeared in front of me. Isn’t this the home I’ve
been looking for? . . . After that, I felt I had a place to belong to. I no longer felt
lonely. I found a place to express my feelings.51

The Internet’s unique multiplicative capacity, combining “link, search, interact,” helps to meet the needs of the educated youth generation well. As individuals start to use the Internet to link, search, and interact using Huaxia
Zhiqing’s websites, Huazhi becomes many things for different people. It is a
space for social interaction, but also for personal expression, mutual help,
political debate, artistic expression, online publishing, and more. In this process, Huazhi’s size and influence have multiplied. But there are numerous
other websites like Huaxia Zhiqing. Why is it Huazhi, and not others, the one
that has become the most influential? One important reason is that Huazhi’s
collective management made better use of the “link, search, interact” functions of the Internet than the operators of similar websites. Soon after the
Huaxia Zhiqing Internet Studio was set up in July 2000, its members went to
other bulletin boards to post advertising messages for Huazhi. By the author’s count, by September 18, 2000, advertising messages had been posted
49. Xiao Fuxing, a well-known writer and former educated youth, says he is dedicated to
writing stories about his generation in the hope that “when history gently turns its pages,” it will
not “casually omit us.” See Xiao Fuxing, Chumo wangshi [Gently touching the past]
(Changchun: Jilin People’s Press, 1998), p. 359.
50. As of April 3, 2003, Huaxia Zhiqing contained links to 122 personal home pages run by
former educated youth. See < http://www.hxzq.net/zqmz1/Default.asp>.
51. <http://www.hxzq.net/xlu/xlu184.htm>, accessed March 30, 2002. Author’s translation.
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in 39 popular bulletin boards, including the influential “Strengthening the
Nation Forum.” The word was spread widely on the Net. Second, although
the Studio has no physical office, its members have turned the Internet into
their virtual office. The Studio had 27 members when it was first set up.
They voted to elect seven as a core leadership group. A private bulletin
board was then set up for the 27 members to discuss “business” related to
Huazhi. Email communication among them is frequent. As Huazhi began to
receive donations, one of the 27 members was designated as treasurer, and
regularly emails accounting information to other members. Thus the Huaxia
Zhiqing Internet Studio became an effective management body through the
use of the interactive features of the Internet. Its organizing efforts have been
essential for Huazhi’s success.
In its five-year history, Huaxia Zhiqing has encountered many challenges.
These challenges reflect the incipient nature of civil society in China. One of
the most daunting challenges is political control. Analysts of Chinese civil
society have often argued that social organizations lack independence and
autonomy. While online communities such as Huazhi clearly enjoy more
independence, they are not immune from political control. Huazhi’s toplevel domain name, hxzq.net, has remained the same since its registration in
July 2000. But before and since then, its bulletin boards have had to migrate
several times. A long-time serving board was <http://www.netsh.com.cn/
bbs/3246>. Here, political discussions became so intensified that the forum
was forced to shut down in May 2000. Before it stopped functioning, the
mysterious but friendly system operator of the dot.com company that owns
the board posted a message saying, “You’ve caused big trouble, that’s all I’ll
say. Please pass on my apologies to your friends too.”52 That event
prompted the members of the forum to set up the Huaxia Zhiqing Internet
Studio in order to sustain the survival of the virtual community. For safety
reasons, through its online network, the Internet Studio managed to lease a
bulletin board run on a foreign server. After using this board for more than a
year, Huazhi shifted back to domestic bulletin boards for technical reasons.
However, to reduce political risks, it instituted a system of moderators. Studio members take turns to serve as moderators for its bulletin boards. Moderators mostly maintain a symbolic presence only, though they do warn users to
stay within political and legal limits in their online behavior. One could argue that online freedom of speech is compromised under these circumstances,
but moderated discussions have so far worked well. Huazhi’s approach to the
challenge of political control may be considered strategic negotiation with the

52. <http://www.netsh.com.cn/bbs/3246/messages/248.html>, accessed May 26, 2000.
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state, as Saich puts it in his recent study of social organizations in China.53
Such an approach has given Huazhi room to grow.
Huaxia Zhiqing is only one of many cases of the co-evolution of the Internet and civil society in contemporary China. Other examples include the
co-evolution of the Internet and China’s environmental groups, the emergence of a new genre of writing called online literature, the proliferation of
intellectually oriented personal home pages, and so forth. The case of
Huaxia Zhiqing, however, exemplifies the co-evolution of the Internet and
civil society particularly well. Members of the educated youth generation
constitute a socially active group in today’s China. They are active in associational life, though usually on an informal basis as unregistered social groups.
Many of them have published personal stories of their past, in print form as
well as on the Internet, and thus intervene in China’s public sphere with their
own critiques of contemporary Chinese society. When they find themselves
online linking up with one another, they contribute to the intensified use of
the Internet and the growth of such websites as Huaxia Zhiqing. At the same
time, Internet use also brings more of them together across vast distances,
thus intensifying and expanding their activities as members of a civil society
group.

Conclusion
This study has argued that while it is important to understand how politics
shapes the Internet, a comprehensive understanding of the evolution of the
Internet requires attention to the interactive dynamics of technology and civil
society. Conceptualizing the development of the Internet and civil society as
a co-evolutionary process provides such an analytic approach. Through a
discussion of the technical features of the Internet and by comparing e-civil
society with e-government and e-commerce in China, the study demonstrates
that the Internet matters for Chinese civil society in notable ways. It has also
shown that China’s incipient civil society—its active or dormant citizen
groups, internal dynamics, and need for public participation—has provided
favorable conditions for Internet diffusion in China. Finally, an ethnographic
study of the co-evolution of a website and a civil society community, Huaxia
Zhiqing, demonstrates in concrete detail the dynamics of the co-evolutionary
process. The arguments in this paper lead to the conclusion that civil society
and the Internet energize each other in today’s China.
Due to the analytic focus of this article, the author has not discussed this
co-evolutionary process within the larger context of globalization and domestic social transformation. It must be recognized that Chinese civil society and
the development of the Internet respond to broader conditions in China and
53. Tony Saich, “Negotiating the State.”
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the world even as they develop along their own paths. This analysis therefore
is not a rejection of but a complement to theories of Internet and civil society
development that emphasize the role of the state or the market. Its contribution lies in showing the actual interactive dynamics of Internet growth and
civil society development, an important but neglected dimension in current
research. In addition, this study contains some broader implications. For one
thing, given the interactive and intertwined relationship between the Internet
and civil society, future research should pay more attention to the recombinatory logics of these two fields of development instead of focusing on
unidirectional causes and effects. A key question for future research will be:
What are the dynamics and consequences of the recombinatory logics underlying the co-evolution of the Internet and different civil society sectors or
groups? For example, what are the dynamics and consequences of the coevolution of the Internet and an online public sphere in China?
Related to this are two political implications. The co-evolution of the Internet and civil society means that political control of the Internet in China
will have to take the form of control of civil society as well, and vice versa.
Both options are open to the state, but the simultaneous control of the Internet
and civil society will add to the difficulty and complexity of control. The coevolutionary process also means that civil society development will facilitate
the democratic uses of the Internet as much as the diffusion of the Internet
will shape civil society. This scenario may have long-term consequences for
the development of the Internet and civil society in China.

